With regard to the relationship between Chinese traditional culture, primarily Confucianism, and modern democracy, Chinese scholars generally hold one of two views: the first takes them as compatible, with Joseph Chan (Chan 2013) and Bai Tongdong (Bai 2019) as its representatives, and the second as incompatible, with Jiang Qing (Jiang 2013) as its representative.1 The former view is relatively more prevalent in current Chinese academia. Specifically, the relevant scholars attempt to argue that there is a possibility for the modernization of Confucianism and the democratization of governance in China.

    Wu Genyou is one of the compatibilists. In this book, Wu argues that Confucian political philosophy and modern, as opposed to Western classical, democracy are compatible. Wu does not take Western political philosophy as the standard by which Confucian political philosophy must be judged, since he takes this approach as a form of Western discursive hegemony (148). Instead, he searches for a common basis for both, proposing that this may be found in humanism (148–149). As one representation of humanism, Wu argues that the Confucian doctrine of ren (humaneness), or the political idea of minben ( people as the foundation of government), can lead to modern democracy, in the sense of compatibility rather than logical deduction (x).

    To draw this conclusion, Wu compares Chinese political philosophy and Western political philosophy from several perspectives. In Part I, he focuses on the metaphysical foundation of law, the transfer of power and political reform with reference to daoyi (the Way and righteousness). In Part II, after introducing some Daoist notions homogenous with Confucian thought, he advocates the Confucian view of the ‘kingly Way for all under Heaven’, by discussing the value of harmony in international political peace. In Part III, he compares the conceptions of freedom in modern democracy and in Confucian texts. In Part IV, Wu argues that democracy, as a universal form, can be realized in China. Based on the discussion from these perspectives, Wu concludes that democracy with humaneness is intrinsically compatible with the Confucian thought of minben, with a mixed political form as a possible future for Chinese democracy (xi).

    Before delving into the discussion provided, it might be better to begin by taking a look at his view on the nature of philosophy, especially political philosophy. Wu presents two distinctive views respectively at the beginning and at the end of this book. One is that of Leo Strauss, according to which the only purpose of philosophy (including political philosophy) is truth. The other is that of John Rawls, who is not concerned with truth, but the reasonable, and who distinguishes political justice and comprehensive moral justice (261). These two views represent two ways of understanding the fact of reasonable disagreement in political philosophy: the former thinks that this can be explained away by reference to the flaws of human beings, while the latter takes this fact to constitute the circumstance of justice. As for Wu, it seems that he inclines to accept the former, since he claims that Rawls’ ideal of justice as fairness is a moral ideal, which implies that political ideas cannot be separated from moral ideas (262). Thus, in Wu’s view, political philosophy cannot gain its autonomy from moral philosophy based on Rawls’ focus on reasonableness. I will not argue whether Wu’s interpretation of Rawls is correct, or whether one view of the nature of political philosophy is, other things being equal, better than the other. But I do want to point out that Wu’s reasoning about the inseparability between political ideas and moral ideas here might be problematic. Admittedly, the justification of a principle of justice ultimately needs to rely on moral ideals to gain its normative force. However, there is a relevant distinction drawn by Larmore, between a purely moral ideal aiming at promoting human goods, and a reflexive second-order principle aiming at settling the question how a law can be justly enforced on people among whom there is reasonable disagreement (Larmore 2013). According to the latter view, political philosophy is not simply a form of applied moral philosophy but an autonomous discipline, since it does not pursue human goods other than the good of stable and peaceful political association. By this, I merely intend to reject the view that the use of moral ideals necessarily make political philosophy aim at truth, or inseparable from moral philosophy, as Wu suggests.

    Another implication of Wu’s view on the nature of political philosophy is that he endorses a doctrine of perfectionism. In other words, he thinks that the good is prior to the right. In particular, Confucian political philosophy as he reconstructs aims to pursue specific human moral goods such as humaneness.

With a view to clarifying Wu’s thought on the nature of political philosophy and locating his positions in terms of Chinese categories as well as Western ones, I will focus in what follows on his discussion of various issues in each part.

    In Part I, Wu explores the metaphysical foundation of Chinese political thought. He claims that the notion of daoyi (legitimate way), as the way to justify political power, is not identical with that of ‘justice’ in Western political philosophy, but similar to that in ancient Greek philosophy, as a form of the natural law (5–7). As for the understanding of daoyi, Wu clarifies that he interprets it differently from Jiang Qing (Jiang 2013) in terms of humanitarianism and the spirit of rationality, rather than as a transcendent principle which might not be relevant in modern society (15).

    With regard to the metaphysical foundation of law, Wu claims that it is Dao, or the heart of Chinese people (31), and compares this with Cicero’s view that the foundation of law is the liberty of the people (27). As for the modern system of law, Wu claims that it should be taken as a means for the people to check the power of the rulers rather than a tool for the ruler (27).

    In relation to the conditions of modern democratization, Wu thinks that cultural tradition and ideology are important factors besides the economic and social conditions. In the Chinese context, such a cultural tradition involves humaneness towards the people (37–39). He claims that any idea that promotes the limitation of royal power, or the division of power, can be counted as democratic (45). This is an extremely weak understanding of democratic ideas. Basically, it implies that all political ideas except those promoting autocratic monarchy can be regarded as democratic, including those promoting meritocracy and aristocracy, regardless of whether the people have a say in the division of power, not to mention an equal say. This is nothing like Western classical democracy or modern democracy, since the former highlights individual rights and freedom, and the latter emphasizes the relation between equality and freedom.

    In this part, Wu mentions several notions as providing metaphysical foundations in Chinese political philosophy, including daoyi, Dao and ren. As foundations, there must be a systematic connection among these notions, instead of random notions simply piled up. However, it seems that Wu takes them as independent without further illustration. Perhaps they all function in different domains as the representation of humanism, the one ultimate value that Wu promotes in Part II. There are potential alternative interpretations as well, but it is not clear from the content provided what Wu thinks of them.

After clarifying the metaphysical foundations in Chinese political philosophy, Wu discusses the views on harmony, including international peace, and the ideals of social justice. He starts by introducing Laozi’s central idea of ‘esteeming Dao and honoring virtue’ (57), which is homogeneous with Confucian thought. Specifically, for Laozi, social harmony can be realized only if Dao and virtue are respected (57).

    With regard to the thought on harmony in the Book of Changes, Wu suggests that the central claim is to ‘preserve great harmony in union’, a result which he thinks is ‘advantageous, correct, and firm’ (65). In his view, this is different from the Western capitalist approach that takes utility as the sole aim, by putting economic activities under the regulation of morality (68–69). Appealing to Marxism, Wu upholds the belief that the demand of liberalism is a minimum requirement and that there should be a higher requirement of full development beyond basic individual liberty (73).

    Wu’s view on the relationship between the economy and morality is compatible with the doctrine of perfectionism as mentioned above. Confucianism, as a comprehensive doctrine of a good life, takes humaneness as the standard of almost every aspect in people’s life, including the economic domain and personal sphere. Accordingly, the sphere of legitimate government activity would be extensive.

    As for the relation between liberalism and Marxism, it seems that, for Wu, the latter is compatible with the former since it can meet the demand of liberalism and put forward a higher demand. Such a view seems implausible due to the fact that they have different conceptions of basic individual liberty, as shown by their replies to the question whether the right to a free market without government management is a basic right. Thus, it is strange to say that Marxism can meet the demand of liberalism. Perhaps a more appropriate view for Wu is that Marxism can meet the demand of individual rights in a broad sense rather than those of liberalism.

    As for the Confucian conception of the international justice, its central claim of a ‘kingly Way for all under Heaven’ in Wu’s view is consistent with the spirit of ren (humaneness). Mencius inherits the idea by promoting the ambition ‘to become a true king of all under Heaven’ (79). Similarly, Xunzi follows Confucius by claiming that the world of the kingly Way relies on the endorsement of the hearts of the people, that is, taking morality as the foundation (85).

    After introducing the Confucian ideal of peace, Wu presents several conceptions of peace in Western philosophy, including those of Kant, Marx and Rawls. He thinks that Kant’s view relies on the right of countries and a psychology of self-protection which at best can maintain temporary peace and at worst can lead to an opposite result (87–88). By contrast, Marx and Engels highlight mankind’s full emancipation, which is obviously more profound than Kant (90). Wu suggests that in order to maintain genuine or perpetual international peace, international relations should be based on duties and mutual trust rather than right or mutual prevention (88).

    Wu’s comment on Kant seems implausible. First of all, in what sense is the Marxist view of international peace obviously more profound than Kant’s? The reason given by Wu seems to be that the former focuses on the annihilation of class antagonism and oppression (90). Such notions are not the focus of Kant. However, Kant’s view is supported by moral psychology, with a lower expectation of human nature as Wu claims, which is arguably more realistic than Marxist vision. Thus, it seems that Kant’s view is more profound in another sense. By this, I merely mean that Wu could be clearer when he makes such a comment.

    This leads to a second problem with Wu’s comment. That is, even if Kant’s focus on rationality cannot realize ideal perpetual international peace, it is not a problem exclusively for Kant, since Wu’s focus on the international ethics cannot realize it either. To illustrate, let us turn to Wu’s proposal that the Confucian conception of a kingly Way for all under Heaven can achieve this goal, in a correct way (89). In other words, by the force of humaneness, perpetual international peace is not only possible, but also possible in a right way. Seemingly Wu assumes that the reason for international conflicts is that some nations behave immorally, and that accordingly humaneness can solve all conflicts. However, as Wu himself admits, personal interest is not identical with selfishness but can be considered as reasonable self-regard (119), which can lead to conflicts due to good-faith disagreements. Given that it is impossible to eliminate conflicts between reasonable personal interests, it is unclear how the international ethics, or the principle of humanness, can achieve perpetual international peace.

    Wu’s comment on Kant might be influenced by the debate between Huntington and Tu Wei-ming over the clash of civilizations and cultural dialogue, since, in his view, the reason for such different perspectives is that the former emphasizes interests and power, while the latter emphasizes responsibilities and duties (99). Accordingly, for him, if a theory can focus more on the duties, it is possible to achieve genuine conversation and international peace. However, it seems that rights and duties are two sides of a coin, both complementary and symmetrical. In other words, it might be misleading to say that Kant emphasizes one without involving the other, since they appear simultaneously. So, for example, we can consistently say that the reason why America invades Afghanistan is based on the consideration of a right, while at the same time based on a consideration of the duty to help other countries. Thus, the distinction between right and duty is not helpful, at least not for Wu to criticize Kant for highlighting the right without being able to achieve perpetual international peace.

    With regard to Rawls, Wu argues that he focuses on the sovereignty of peoples rather than that of states, which is different from Kant (94). However, Rawls ignores the hypocrisy of the value of liberty and democracy in contemporary capitalist society, and thus he is unable to elaborate the relationship between world peace and the full emancipation of human beings (94). Again, Wu advocates the Confucian kingly Way for all under Heaven. Specifically, genuine world peace could be achieved through attracting foreign peoples by the force of virtue, without imposing ideals on others (100).

    Wu’s comment on Rawls seems implausible since he switches position constantly between the reality and the ideal. As an ideal theory, Rawls’ view of international relations has nothing to do with the actual performance of Western capitalist societies. If Wu insists that the evaluation of a theory should involve the consideration of its actual performance, then such a requirement should be applied to his own view. By looking at the actual performance of the Confucian kingly Way for all under Heaven, the reality is that it causes conflicts and that some Western societies take it as a form of hypocritical political propaganda. Thus, other things being equal, it is no better than Rawls’ view. In addition, it should be noted again that international conflicts are not merely the production of being immoral. Accordingly, Wu needs to say more about the necessary relation between the influence of virtues and perpetual international peace, in addition to the claim that foreign people would be attracted, which I suspect is over-confident about the influence of virtues.

    Wu might reply to this objection by clarifying his methodology. Similar to the way in which Rawls treats agents in the original condition as rational and reasonable, in Wu’s view the original condition in Confucianism relies on a conception of human nature (273). Specifically, for Wu, both of them can be classified as an ideal theory, with a certain assumption of idealized agents. Accordingly, Wu can presuppose strict compliance, so that all under the Heaven can recognize the value of Confucian humaneness and be attracted. However, Wu’s criticism towards Rawls is still not fair since by such a methodology Rawls can be immune to the problems in reality as well.

    In Part III, Wu focuses on the conceptions of freedom. In traditional Chinese thought, there has been abundant discussion of freedom. For Confucianism, it is complying to humaneness (115). Wu specifically introduces the ‘cultural liberalism’ put forward by Xu Fuguan (Xu 1985). Xu thinks that democracy based on humaneness is superior to that in Western society based on utilitarianism, and that it is compatible with modern democracy (135). In Wu’s view, however, Xu’s cultural liberalism has the problem of being one-sided, that is, paying too much attention to traditional personal dignity without being aware of individual rights as a necessary element of modernity (146).

    Wu agrees with Xu that it is possible to realize political quality, namely, rational or humanistic political decisions, through political quantity, namely, extensive political participation, since experts can express their ideas in ways that appeal to the public. This is related to the tension between political quality and political quantity: generally, if everyone has a say in the political procedure, the result can intuitively be irrational; while if the rationality of the result is emphasized, then necessarily some ‘irrational’ agents would be excluded from the public discussion. In Wu’s view, such a tension would disappear by appealing to humaneness, which necessarily leads to humanistic politics (127–128). In other words, for him, it is not merely possible to realize political quality through political quantity; but necessary with a moral constraint.

    Such a moral constraint leads to another interpretation involving the distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice (Rawls 1999). Given Wu’s claim that a political procedure with the constraint of humaneness would necessarily lead to rational results, he endorses a doctrine of perfect procedural justice, which seems problematic. The problem is shown as follows: Wu suggests that elites be allowed to influence the citizens to voluntarily choose humane policies rather than impose such policies on the citizens; but the necessary production of rational results is doubtful by giving citizens options, even with the influence of elites. For example, there is an anti-intellectual group of people in the society who will not be influenced by them. Most importantly, Wu under-estimates the fact of reasonable disagreement. Specifically, even if humaneness were a universal value accepted by all, people interpret this value differently, which would make Wu’s suggestion unacceptable to some in the society even if they are not anti-intellectual. Thus, there is no voluntary procedure which can guarantee rational results, especially that defined by the Confucian conception of humaneness.

    One reason why Wu highlights this necessity might be that he agrees with Xu that democracy with humaneness is superior to that in Western society based on utilitarianism. However, as shown, such necessity needs additional justification. Unless it is provided, Wu’s theory is imperfect procedural justice at best. If so, the claim about the superiority of democracy with humaneness is doubtful. Perhaps it is better for Wu to claim that democracy with humanism is more likely to produce the rational result than Western democracy.However, such a relatively moderate claim needs additional justification as well.

    It seems that Wu himself is aware of those problems, since he points out that Confucian humaneness pays too much attention to moral commitments, without sufficient attention to personal rights (157). At the same time, in Wu’s view, Western classical liberalism pays too much attention to individual rights and rationality, as seen in Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza and Rousseau (159). Different from these two extremes, modern liberalism, such as Rawls’ political liberalism, tries to strike a balance (160). Wu suggests that Confucianism and liberalism should each learn from the other to enrich the content of humanism (162), following the thought of Liang Qichao (Liang 1983) and Yin Haiguang (Yin 2001), as the basic idea of a mixed political form for Chinese democracy.

    Accordingly, in Part IV, Wu tries to search for a common basis between Confucian political philosophy and Western democracy, by comparing the conceptions of minben and democracy. Wu takes Mencius’ idea of minben as an early form of the modern theory of contract, which is inherited and developed by later scholars (234). Similarly for the idea of democracy in the Western tradition, there is a process of development from the idea of aggregative democracy to the modern form of deliberative democracy.

    After comparing the history of political thought in China and the West, on the basis of the thoughts of Sun Yat-sen (Sun 1981), Wu suggests that both minben and democracy confirm the importance of the people, and accept the ideas of government ‘of the people’ and ‘for the people,’ but that the idea of government ‘by the people’ is lacking in minben (252). Wu claims that the absent idea of the people having political power can be integrated into minben so as to be compatible with modern democracy (253). Nevertheless, to add this idea, he does not mean that everyone should or could participate in state government (280). Instead, in relation to the moral constraint of political quantity, Wu thinks that political power is to be gained by passing a moral and technical threshold, under the condition of fair equality of opportunity. Specifically, those who pass the threshold have a decisive say, but this still leaves all the people including those who do not pass the threshold with the right to check the power of the rulers (280). This can be seen as the main thesis of Wu’s mixed political form.

    Since the development lines of political thought in China and the West are similar, it is reasonable to believe that the conditions and concrete implementations of Chinese democratization can be maintained, as they have in the West (254). But it is confusing to suppose that such transformation has something to do with minben. It seems that even if the notion of government ‘by the people’ indeed can be somehow added into minben, either the transformed minben is actually a Chinese liberalism rather than genuine minben, or that the notion added is not a genuine one of government ‘by the people.’ To reveal the dilemma clearly, I will examine closely the notion of government ‘by the people’.

    For Wu, the key element in this notion is fair equality of opportunity, which can be seen in Rawls’ political liberalism as well. Nevertheless, Rawls uses it to justify unequal distribution of (primary social) goods, while Wu uses it to justify unequal distribution of political power. Accordingly, for Wu, this notion is actually one of government ‘by the people who can meet a certain threshold of virtue and technique’, which is a purely formal conception of political equality, since it leaves the people with unequal substantive influence on political decisions. A threshold of technique might not be ad hoc, but one of virtue is problematic when the content of virtue here is substantive. The reason is that such a threshold is readily accessible for those who already accept the value of Confucian humaneness, while it might be inaccessible for those who endorse a different or conflicting value of humaneness. Consequently, by privileging a certain group of people, such a threshold would make the ‘fair equality of opportunities’ a means of domination of Confucianism. Perhaps Wu thinks that Confucian conception of humaneness is thin enough to be compatible with all other comprehensive doctrines. But he does not provide clear illustration in relation to this issue. In short, with a Confucian moral constraint added to the notion of government ‘by the people’, this reshaped notion seems to be a non-genuine one of government ‘by the people’.

    On the other hand, even if such a notion is plausible, the conception of minben that it implies seems to be incompatible with the original. The reason is that even though Mencius emphasizes the value of the people, he does not mean that the people can manage a country, or make political decisions, together with the rulers. Instead, for Mencius, the people are understood as the recipients of rational political decisions, rather than the co-authors of political decisions. If the notion of government ‘by the people’ is added, the conception of minben simply becomes alien or unintelligible to Mencius.

    All in all, in this book, Wu explores the relationship between the history of political thought in China and the West, with comprehensive scholarship, in order to argue as most neo-Confucianists do that the Confucian conception of minben is compatible with modern democracy. For Wu, humanism is a key value of modern democracy, which means taking human beings as the end, with the possibility of multiple realizations of this value. In Western society, the emphasis lies on the right of human beings to participate in government; whereas in China the emphasis is placed on the good of human beings. Accordingly, in Wu’s view, the Confucian conception of minben is compatible with modern democracy, as the basis for a mixed form of Chinese democracy. However, in the light of the problems detailed above, it seems that the notion of government ‘by the people’ cannot be added to the conception of minben without making one of them undergo qualitative change. Thus, there are questions that remain to be answered and further illustration needed for the mixed form of democracy advocated by Wu to be either possible or promising.